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THE IMPACT OF THE 'TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS' ON THE
TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN AND ITS CURES
M. Brendan Chatham*
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: "TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS"
The United States' trade deficit with Japan is being fueled, in large part,
by a technology transfer surplus from U.S. business to Japanese business.'
The term "technology transfer surplus" connotes that U.S. businesses are
losing a greater amount of exclusive development rights (i.e. patent rights)
associated with patentable technology to Japanese firms than it acquires from
Japanese firms.2
The technology transfer surplus contributes significantly to the United
States-Japan trade imbalance in the following manner. The primary value
of technology to its owner is its potential to generate wealth and profits via
the manufacture of consumer goods and products.3 When technology is
patentable, the owner of the technology in question maintains the right to
develop the technology exclusive of other would-be developers.' It follows
that the patent owner also maintains the exclusive right to the wealth
generated by the technology's development. Conversely, when the exclusive
right to develop technology is lost, so is the exclusive right to profit.
Though at first glance the lopsided transfer of development rights to
* J.D. 1996.
'See, e.g., Ronald E. Yates, U.S. Still Draining its Reservoir of Technological Innovation,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 1992, at BI, B2; e.g. Patent Protections in Japan; L Survey of
U.S. Firms' Experiences, 15 EAST ASIAN ExEcurIVE REPORTS, Oct. 15, 1993, available in
LEXIS, at 9. [hereinafter Patent Protections in Japan I]. All page numbers for Patent
Protections in Japan 1, II, and III are LEXIS page citations.
2 I developed the 'technology transfer surplus' myself to describe U.S. business' net loss
of exclusive development rights to Japanese business.
3 See Thomas L. Powers and Ricardo P. Leal, Is the U.S. Innovative? A Crossnational
Study of Patent Activity, 34 MGMT. INT'L REV. 67 (Jan. 1994).
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
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Japanese firms from U.S. firms appears to decrease the trade deficit, in
reality the lopsided transfer of rights increases Japanese firms' profits from
the development of patentable technology, while simultaneously eliminating
U.S. firms' ability to profit from the same technology.5 Therefore, reducing
the flow of technology from the United States to Japan is a method of
reducing the trade deficit.
II. THE CAUSES OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS
Two interrelated phenomena account for the one-sided transfer of
technology from the United States to Japan. First, American business loses
technology to its Japanese counterparts when it attempts to patent its
inventions in Japan.6 Japan's patent system provides patentable subject
matter with less protection of exclusive development rights than does the
American patent system.7 This lower level of protection encourages patent
system users to manipulate the Japanese system with a practice known as
patent flooding! Through patent flooding, Japanese firms are able to usurp
the exclusive development rights associated with technology of American
users of the Japanese system.9
The next phenomenon, coercive licensing,10 is the practical effect of
American firms' patent flooding experience with the Japanese patent system.
' See Yates, supra note 1, at B3-B5.
6 See Donald M. Spero, Patent Protection of Piracy--A CEO Views Japan, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 58.
7 Samson Helfgott, Cultural Differences Between the U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems,
3 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 269 (Dec. 1989), reprinted in 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 231, 236 (1990).
' See Patent Protection in Japan; II. Causes of U.S. Firms' Patent Problems, Effects of
Firms' Patent Practices, Recent JPO Changes, 15 EAST ASIAN EXECLvE REPORTS, Nov.
15 1993 at 6, 12. [hereinafter Patent Protection in Japan II]. 'Patent flooding', explained in
greater detail below, is the term commonly employed to describe the conduct of firms who
manipulate the Japanese patent system in order to appropriate the profitability associated with
the development of the original subject matter, or to force licensing agreements with the
owners of the rights to the original subject matter. See, e.g., Spero, supra note 6; infra note
112 and accompanying text for recent example of patent flooding.
9 Id.
10 l at 5. "Japanese companies use patent flooding as a tactic to force cross-licensing
by obtaining patents on numerous and insignificant variations [of the basic technology],
holding another inventor's basic patent 'hostage' with the threat of bringing an infringement
action based on the variations." Id.
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Some U.S. firms opt to enter licensing arrangements with their Japanese
counterparts whereby technology is transferred to the Japanese firm in
exchange for payment, instead of attempting to navigate the Japanese patent
system and risk a total loss of rights and profitability via patent flooding."
These firms view the inadequate protection of patent rights and the resulting
lost profits as inevitable consequences of employing the Japanese patent
system. Consequently, entering licensing agreements generates at least some
return on their development investment of the patentable subject matter. 2
Such agreements appear to reduce the trade deficit between the United States
and Japan because they are actual exportations to Japan from the United
States. 3 Yet, in fact, such agreements exacerbate the deficit. Selling or
licensing the rights to develop one's technology results in the forfeiture of
exclusive rights to profits that the technology will generate.' 4  When
consumer products resulting from the development of the transferred
technology are marketed in the United States, the sales proceeds return to the
Japanese owner of the technology. 5
An additional factor that contributes to the technology transfer surplus is
that Japanese users of the U.S. patent system are able to employ the
excellent patent protections provided by the American system. As a result,
U.S. firms are unable to counterbalance their losses in Japan with a
" See Patent Protection in Japan; 1, supra note 1, at 9. This article summarizes the
results of a GAO survey of United State's users of the Japanese patent system conducted by
the U.S. General Accounting Office at the behest of senators Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Dennis
DeConcini (D-AZ), and Lloyd Bentson (D-TX).
12 Id. at 20.
13 See Yates, supra note 1, at BI, B2. "In 1990 U.S. companies sold some $2.5 billion
in technology to Japanese firms via licensing and patent agreements, while the Japanese sold
less than $500 million in technology licenses and patents to American firms." Id.
14 Id.
"S Id. The transfer of videocassette recording technology from Ampex, an American firm,
to Sony, a Japanese firm, provides a prime example of the incredible magnitude such
technology transfers can have on the trade deficit. Video cassette recording technology was
developed by Ampex in the late 1950's. In 1960 Ampex sought out Sony to improve this
technology hoping to incorporate Sony's transistor technology into its video cassette recorder
designs. The idea was that the marriage of Sony's transistor technology with Ampex's
videocassette recording technology would yield small, inexpensive units perfect for public
consumption. Before the deal could be consummated, however, Ampex's management
panicked, and backed out of the relationship. Sony successfully sued Ampex which resulted
in a fully paid license to use Ampex's technology to create videocassette recorders for the
marketplace. The rest, as they say, is history.
1996]
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corresponding gain in the United States.
Thus far the phenomena generating the technology transfer surplus have
been briefly described, but more important questions remain: What qualities
of the Japanese patent system encourage the technology transfer surplus?
And, how may the technology transfer surplus be remedied? These questions
are relevant because their answers will aid in devising strategies for reducing
the technology surplus which will likewise reduce the trade deficit.
III. WHY JAPAN'S PATENT SYSTEM OPERATES TO FACILITATE THE
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS: ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS THEORIES
Three major theories attempt to explain why American firms lose the
ability to develop patentable subject matter exclusively. In addition to
describing these theories, this note will outline an additional possibility.
A. Out-right Discrimination Theory
According to proponents of this view, the Japan Patent Office (JPO)
simply discriminates against foreign users because every attribute of the
Japanese system is designed to reduce the ability of foreign users to protect
their patent rights. 16 Japanese users benefit from this discrimination by
gaining access to valuable patentable subject matter of foreign entities. 7
These proponents fail to note, however, that all users of the JPO, including
Japanese entities, experience the loss of patent rights due to the system's
design and manipulation in nearly the same degree.'" Ironically, in fact, the
American system is more blatantly discriminatory and fraught with peril for
unwitting foreign applicants than the Japanese system.'9
16 See Patent Protections in Japan I, supra note 1, at 18.
17 Id.
is See Michael Todd Helfand, How Valid Are U.S. Criticisms of the Japanese Patent
System?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 123, 139 (1992).
19 The Hilmer Doctrine and 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1984) operate to give domestic patent
applicants an advantage over their foreign counterparts. Section 104 prohibits the use of
conduct that occurs in foreign countries to prove an invention date for a PTO patent
application. In other words, only conceptualization and reduction to practice activities
occurring in the United States are admissible as evidence for determining an invention date.
Likewise, the Hilmer Doctrine precludes foreign U.S. patent holders from using their foreign
patent filing dates as a reference point for determining 'prior art' against other U.S.
applications concerning the same patentable subject matter. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859
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B. Practice Makes Perfect Theory
Under this view, Japanese firms' tactical advantage in the ability to
manipulate the JPO for the appropriation of patentable subject matter is a
matter of practical reality. Japanese firms gain this advantage in two ways.
One way is through practical experience.' Since the system is native to
Japan, Japanese users have a greater incentive to learn its nuances, and use
the system's lower protections offensively.2' American firms do not have
this same incentive, and instead are ambivalent towards learning to master
using the Japanese system.
Second, Japanese firms involved in the development of patentable subject
matter are typically very large corporations that maintain the resources
necessary to manipulate the JPO effectively.22 Conversely, much smaller
firms are responsible for the bulk of the development of patentable subject
matter in the United States.23 Smaller businesses are generally less liquid,
and therefore less able to commit the resources required to navigate the JPO
without experiencing a loss of rights.24
(C.C.P.A. 1966). The issue in Hilmer was whether section 119 of Title 35 was correlative
with section 102. Section 119 permits foreign PTO applicants to 'back up' their effective
filing date in the U.S. to the filing date of a previously filed foreign application. As will be
discussed, section 102 provides that previously issued patents constitute 'prior art' as of their
date of filing, which is a novelty bar to future patent issuance for similar subject matter. The
court in Hilmer reasoned that Congress' only purpose in promulgating section 119 was to
comply with the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, while the
purpose of section 102 was designed to advantage U.S. inventors over foreign inventors.
Therefore the court in Hilmer determined that section 119 was not correlative with section
102, and thus, a U.S. patent granted to a foreign applicant becomes prior art only as of its
actual U.S. filing date, not the effective U.S. filing date provided by section 119. For an
in-depth analysis of the Hilmer Doctrine, see Kevin L. Leffel, Hilmer Doctrine and Patent
System Harmonization: What Does A Foreign Inventor Have at Stake?, 26 AKRON L. REV.
355 (1992).
20 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 159-162.
21 Id; see also Effect of the Japanese Patent System on American Business: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Effect Hearing].
2 Id. at 149; see also Spero, supra note 6, at 59.
2 See Effect Hearing, supra note 21, at 46-47; see also William T. Fryer, 1989 Summary
of Proceedings, 1989-1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 94 [hereinafter
Summary of Proceedings].
24 See Spero, supra note 6, at 59.
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While these observations are accurate, they do not aid in determining why
the Japanese patent system offers less substantive protection of development
rights than the U.S. system.
C. Difference in Patent Systems' Objectives Theory
The last prevailing view posits that differences in the goals of the
respective patent systems leads to less patent protection in Japan than in the
United States.25 These commentators believe that the aim of the Japanese
patent system is to promote Japan's industrial development, while the aim
of the American system is to encourage and protect the individual's
exclusive right to develop his or her creations.
26
D. Author's Theory
In my view, the goals of the respective systems are analogous: the
promotion of the development of science and technology within each
27country. The aim of the U.S. patent system is set by the Intellectual
Property clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. ''2' The Japanese patent statute
begins in Article 1 by proclaiming "this law aims to encourage inventions
by promoting the protection and utilization of inventions and thereby, to
contribute to the development of industry."'29 The difference between the
two systems lies in the manner in which this aim is to be achieved.
The Japanese believe that the development of science is best achieved
2 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 134; Helfgott, supra note 7, at 232.
2 See Helfgott, supra note 7, at 232, 234. Helfgott describes each system in the
following manner: "[I]n the U.S., the essential purpose of a patent is to protect the patentee,"
while "the goal of the Japanese patent system is to teach industry new innovations." Id.; see
also Helfand, supra note 18, at 134. Similarly, Helfand describes each system this way:
"[The goal of the U.S. system is]... to protect the inventions and discoveries of individuals,"
while "the goal [of the Japanese system is] ... to promote the development of Japanese
industry." Id.
27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; see PATENT LAW, LAW No. 121 of Apr. 13, 1959,
art. I (Japan) [hereinafter JAPAN PATENT LAW].
2' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29 JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 1.
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through a policy that encourages sharing technology, so that all of an
industry's resources may be put forth collectively to increase overall
development of the industry, technology and the speed at which this
development occurs.3" In contrast, the United States seeks to encourage the
development of science by providing incentives for individuals to invent.31
These conflicting incentives generate the differences in substantive and
procedural hurdles each system employs to determine patentability, in
addition to the phenomena discussed earlier that result in the technology
transfer surplus. By comparing the substantive and procedural hurdles
implemented by each system, the causes of the technology transfer surplus
will crystallize.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE
PATENT SYSTEMS
A. Origins of Respective Patent Systems
The U.S. Patent System, embodied in Title 35 of the U.S.C., 32 is a
Congressional creation mandated by the Intellectual Property Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.3 3 Title 35 is in essence a federally-marshaled, incen-
tive-laden contract offer by the government on behalf of society, where an
inventor bargains for a limited right of exclusive development of the subject
matter of the invention in exchange for full disclosure of the subject matter
via publication to society.'
In general, Title 35 authorizes the creation of the Office of Patents and
Trademark (PTO), and authorizes the PTO to examine patent applications for
the purpose of granting or denying patent protection.35 Additionally, Title
35 provides the procedural guidelines for initiating the patent application
3o See Helfgott, supra note 7, at 236.
31 See Summary of Proceedings, supra note 23, at 94.
32 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 100-376 (1984).
33 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 See, e.g., Michael A. Epstein, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (2d ed. 1992). "In
return for the seventeen year right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented item, the patentee must disclose with particularity the subject matter of the patent."
Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 416 U.S. 470 (1974). "In return for the right
of exclusion-'this reward for inventions.' " Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471
(1944)-the patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure." Id.
" See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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process,' the substantive guidelines of patentability which propels the
PTO's examination process, 37 and procedures for contesting PTO rul-
ings.38
Japan's entrance into the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property" in 1899 led to the adoption of its present patent system embod-
ied in Law No. 121, passed in 1959.' This law, in addition to the Utility
Model Law, Law No. 123, 1959,"' encompasses the current invention
protection available in Japan. These laws mandate the creation of the Japan
Patent Office (JPO), which is authorized to perform functions analogous to
those performed by the United States' PTO.
B. Comparison of Philosophical Objectives of Respective Patent Systems
As the previous description indicates, both the American and Japanese
patent systems aim at the same end: the promotion of scientific and
technological development.42 The conflict between the two systems arises
from the basic assumptions each system has adopted as its starting point for
reaching these analogous ends.43 The U.S. system is designed to provide
protection for one's subject matter from competitors, so that the individual
will have a greater incentive to develop fully all the scientific and technolog-
ical potential of the subject matter."4 Conversely, Japan's system is
designed to promote the development of science and technology through the
sharing of innovations with all parties potentially able to improve upon the
innovation.43
36Id. § 111.
37 Id. §§ 101-103.
'8 Id. § 122.
39 Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, T.S. No. 379.
40 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 1.
41 See UTILITY MODEL LAW, LAW No. 123 of April 13, 1959.
42 Compare U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, c1. 8 with JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art.
1.
43 But see Helfgott, supra note 7, at 232. ("In the U.S., the essential purpose of a patent
is to protect the patentee."); but see Helfand, supra note 18, at 133. ("[T]he goal of the
Japanese system differs fundamentally from that of the United States.")
4 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45 Arthur Wineberg, The Japanese Patent System: A Non-tariff Barrier to Foreign
Businesses?, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 11, 19 (1988).
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This difference in primary assumptions generates the balance of major
differences between the two systems, including patentability requirements,
filing procedures, examination procedures, claim interpretation, and
infringement analyses. These differences will be discussed below, with an
emphasis on how these differences affect the surplus technology transfer with
Japan.
C. Comparison of Respective Substantive Requirements of Patentability
1. Definition of Invention: Requirements of Usefulness, Novelty, and
Non-obviousness
The substantive requirements of patentability are fairly analogous between
the two systems and contribute negligibly to the difference in protections
offered. Both systems require that patentable subject matter be useful, novel,
and unobvious to persons reasonably skilled in the discipline to which the
subject matter pertains.' 6
U.S.C. Title 35 defines a patentable invention as a "new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.' '47  In similar
fashion, Japan's patent law provides that a patentable invention is "any high
grade creation among creations of technical idea utilizing natural rules. 48
Novelty requires that the subject matter be original, and not precluded by
the existence of "prior art."' 9 "Prior art" encompasses the state of technolo-
gy known at the date of invention or the date of application filing' in the
discipline to which the subject matter pertains." In both patent systems
prior art will preclude patentability in the following instances: when the
subject matter of the present application exists in a previously issued
4See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; see JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 2, 29.
47 35 U.S.C. § 101.
4JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 2.
49 See generally, Epstein, supra note 34, at Ch. 6, II, C. For the convenience of those
readers who may have access to similar editions of Epstein's MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (other than the second edition) references will be made not to page numbers, but
to chapters and parts.
50 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29. In jurisdictions like Japan that employ
a first-to-file application priority system, prior art is determined as of the application's filing
date.
51 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
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patent;52 when knowledge or use of the invention by persons other than the
applicant occurs prior to the present application filing;53 when description
of the subject matter by a party other than the applicant appears in a printed
publication;' when abandoned previous applications contain the same
subject matter.55
Non-obviousness, also known as the inventive step, is the final substantive
patentability hurdle for both systems.56 It requires that a person reasonably
skilled within the discipline to which the subject matter pertains would not
have found the subject matter obviously connected to the present state of
technology in the discipline in question.57
2. Determining Application Priority
a. United States' 'First-to-Invent' Provision
In contrast to most of the patent systems around the world, the United
States employs the first-to-invent priority system to determine which
applicant among a group of competing applicants is eligible to own the
patent for the subject matter in question.58 Under the American approach,
the first inventor is considered the true inventor, and as such, is entitled to
patent ownership despite a previously filed patent application for the same
subject matter by a party other than the true inventor.59
In order to defeat the priority of a previously filed application for the
identical patentable subject matter, the true inventor must show an earlier
'date of invention' than the competing applicant.' The invention date is
defined as the point in time when a inventor conceives of the patentable
52 See 36 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
53 See 36 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
'4 See 36 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
55 See 36 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
56 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 103; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 29.
57 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225-227 (1976). 'Reasonably skilled' means more
than mere layperson, or person with ordinary skill within the discipline.
5' See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101. Both provisions describe
inventors as the parties eligible to obtain patents. Japan's First-to-file System, described in
detail below, is typical of the priority system employed by most countries.
59 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
6 Id.
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subject matter and then reduces it to practice6l either tangibly via actual
'working' of the invention, or constructively via a sufficiently detailed
description of how the invention will work in the patent application.62
Thus, by offering proof of an earlier invention date, a true inventor can
defeat the priority of a previously filed application of a competing non-in-
ventor.
Additionally, a party can show true inventor status even when the earlier
filing party has also reduced the patentable subject matter to practice prior
in time.63 Provided that the true inventor was the first to conceive of the
patentable subject matter, his or her subsequent failure to reduce the
invention to practice sooner in time than the other applicant does not defeat
his or her application if he or she can show reasonable diligence in
attempting to reduce the invention to practice from the point of concep-
tion.' Reasonable diligence entails relatively continuous efforts to reduce
the patentable subject matter to practice.65
b. Japan's 'First-to-File' Provision
In contrast to the American priority provision, the Japanese patent system
awards the patent to the earliest filer among a group of patent applicants
claiming the same subject matter, regardless of whether the first filer claimed
an earlier date of invention.'
The major difference between the priority systems is the filing incentives
each provides. The first-to-invent system provides an incentive for inventors
to research the commercial viability of an invention prior to initiating the
61 ld. Section 102(g) provides that "in determining priority of invention there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was fast to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a
time prior to conception by the other." Id.
62 See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, ch. 715.07 (5th ed., 13th rev. Nov. 1989). This document
describes 'constructive' reduction to practice as accomplished by the mere filing of an U.S.
patent application.
' See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
64 Id.
65See Epstein, supra note 34, at ch. 6, II, C.
6See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 39. "In the case there have been made
two or more patent applications with regard to the same invention on different dates, only the
earliest patent application may obtain a patent on such invention." Id
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application process in order to determine whether the potential profitability
of the subject matter warrants the expense of patent protection. 67 Converse-
ly, the first-to-file system provides an incentive for inventors to file
applications early, and then proceed with profitability exploration, in order
to avoid the risk of losing patent rights to an earlier filer. 6
Each patent system employs a priority determination system that is most
beneficial to its typical native user. Since small firms are responsible for the
bulk of innovative activity in the United States,69 the first-to-invent system
is tailored to their patent protection needs, while the first-to-file system of
Japan is tailored to the needs of large firms.
Of course, a large firm will suffer no disadvantage from the incentives
provided by the first-to-invent system, so long as it documents an invention
date.7" The dilemma facing small firms using the first-to-file system,
however, requires choosing between allocating resources for filing quickly
or profitability exploration.
Acquiring patent protection is an expensive venture. An applicant must
employ a lawyer skilled in patent filing, and pay rather expensive filing fees.
Additionally, since applications must be completed in the language native to
the patent system, translation is an additional cost of filing a foreign
application in either country.7' Consequently, a firm that researches the
commercial viability of the subject matter prior to filing could lose valuable
patent rights in Japan if a competitor is able to "pirate" the subject matter
and file the first patent application for the subject matter in Japan. This is
the first phenomenon described that facilitates the surplus technology
transfer. On the other hand, if the firm chooses to file a patent application
quickly to ensure being first, and subsequently learns that the subject matter
is unmarketable, then the patent protection is acquired in vain.
The differing priority determination requirements generate conflicting
incentives that have an adverse effect on small firms, as compared to large
67 See Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution
to the United States' First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 702 (1993).
68 See Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 779, 785-786 (1991).
69 See Effect Hearing, supra note 21, at 46-47.
70 See Conley, supra note 68, at 784-785.
7 See Patent Protection in Japan II, supra note 8, at 13. The GAO survey found that
filing costs in Japan were the greatest in the world, mainly because of the cost of translation
charged by Japanese patent attorneys. The average cost of filing in Japan was $4,772,
compared to only $1,390 in the United States.
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firms, and subsequently contribute to the United States' technology transfer
surplus with Japan.
D. Comparison of Respective Procedural Requirements
1. Native Language Requirement
The JPO requires that an application for patent be filed in Japanese,
72
while the PTO accepts applications in the applicant's native language, as
long as an English translation is forwarded within two months of the original
filing.73
2. Stating a Claim
Both the PTO and JPO require that an application include a statement of
specification in which the details of the subject matter and a claim to their
inventiveness are provided.7 4 The statement must be sufficiently detailed
so as to enable other persons engaged in the discipline to which the subject
matter pertains to make or use the subject matter themselves. 75 Finally, the
language comprising the claim is used by courts to interpret the scope of the
76subsequently issued patent, so the applicant's own words determine thebreadth of protection received.
' Helfand, supra note 18, at 128. But see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
73 Id.
7' See 35 U.S.C. § 111 ("[An] application shall include (1) a specification as prescribed
by section 112 of this title; (2) a drawing as prescribed by section 113 of this title."); JAPAN
PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 36-2 ("An application shall be accompanied by a
specification setting forth the following matters and a necessary drawing or drawings: (1)
Title of invention; (2) Brief explanation of drawing; (3) Detailed explanation of invention.").
7' See 35 U.S.C. § 112. ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."); JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note
27, art. 36-3 ("The detailed explanation of the invention under subsection(2) shall state the
purpose, constitution and effect of the invention in such a manner that it may easily be carried
out by a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains.").
76 See 35 U.S.C. § 11; JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 36-3.
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3. The Application Examination Process
The manner in which patent applications are examined by the respective
patent offices is drastically different in many respects. First, the average
pendency period, the duration between the filing of an application and the
resulting grant or denial, is nineteen months for applications examined at the
PTO, 7 while 6-7 years at the JPO.
71
Many factors contribute to this difference in pendency periods. First, the
JPO is understaffed in examiners in comparison to the PTO.79  Next,
applicants for Japanese patents must request an examination; examinations
are not an automatic occurrence with a filing, as they are in the United
States.' Finally, the combination of application publication and opposition
procedures in Japan operate to extend the pendency period. These last two
factors represent procedures that are almost diametrically opposed to PTO
procedures, and will be discussed in greater detail below.
a. PTO Secret Examination Procedure
Title 35 requires that an inventor's patent application be held in confi-
dence by the PTO during the examination process.8' Only applications for
which patents are issued are ultimately published; those denied patentprotection remain unpublished,82 and presumably secret, unless the applicant
has publicized the subject matter. If not, the applicant can keep the
unpatentable subject matter as a trade secret if it so desires.8 3
77U.S. Firms' Patent Problems in Japan Confirmed by GAO Survey, Pat. Trademark, &
Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at 2 (July 15, 1993).781d.
7 See Patent Protection In Japan II, supra note 8, at 10 ("The ratio of patent applications
filed to patent examiners is about four times higher in Japan than in the U.S.").
80 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 48. An application may lay unexamined
for 7 years prior to being deemed abandoned.
81 35 U.S.C. § 122. ("[A]pplications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent
and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the
applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in
such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner.").
2 id.
83 See Helfgott, supra note 7, at 233.
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b. JPO Application Publication Procedure
In direct contrast to the U.S. method of handling patent applications, all
patent applications filed with the JPO are published 18 months after such
filing in the Patent Gazette (Kokoku Koho).84 The purpose of this proce-
dure is to foster Japanese technological development by sharing the subject
matter with all interested parties. In addition, the publication procedure is
supposed to provide forewarning to competitors of the applicant's research
and development accomplishments so that they may steer clear of such areas
in their own research and development to avoid future infringement
complications.8"
The practical effect of publication is that interested parties i.e. those who
monitor the Patent Gazette may embark on development of the subject matter
themselves without penalty, because at the time of publication no patent
protections exist for the subject matter contained in the application.8 6 Thus,
no remedy for the use of the subject matter by a competitor is available to
the applicant during the application's pendency period.
The immediate impact the combination of PTO confidentiality and JPO
publication has on the technology transfer surplus is obvious: Japanese users
of the PTO benefit from the secrecy of the application examination, while
U.S. users of the JPO have the subject matter of their applications divulged
publicly. Though Japanese users of the JPO also have their applications
published, such publication occurs in Japanese. Therefore, U.S. firms
desiring to monitor the Patent Gazette must spend additional sums for
translations. Consequently, the publication of applications in Japan
contributes to the technology transfer surplus when U.S. firms interact with
the JPO, because Japanese firms have superior access to the information
necessary to patent flood effectively.
Finally, application publication in Japan erases any ability to protect
4 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 51; John C. Lindgren and Craig J. Yudell,
Protecting American Intellectual Property in Japan, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH
TECH. L. J. 1, 18 (1994). The Japanese terms for the Patent Gazette are Kokai and Kokoku.
Kokai refers to the publication of filed applications, while Kokoku refers to the publication
of pending applications just prior to patent issuance. Hence, applications for which patents
issue are published twice.
8 See Helfgott, supra note 7, at 235; see also Mark F. Wachter, Patent Enforcement in
Japan: An American Perspective for Success, 19 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 59 (1991). The Japanese
cultural abhorrence of confrontation also explains the desire to avoid litigation.
86 See Patent Protections in Japan I1, supra note 8, at 12.
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unpatentable subject matter as trade secrets. 7 Conversely, PTO filers of
unpatentable subject matter are protected because of the confidentiality
enveloping the PTO examination process. s As a result, American firms
filing with the JPO automatically forfeit the ability to treat unpatentable
subject matter as a trade secret, while Japanese firms filing PTO applications
do not. Of course, Japanese firms are likely to file patent applications
resulting in publication, but since publication is in their native language
American firms will incur enormous monitoring and translation expenses in
order to gain access to the subject matter of their competitors' applications.
c. JPO Prior User Rights
Most first-to-file patent systems, like Japan's, also employ the equitable
tool, 'prior user rights'.8 9 Japan's prior user rights provision permit parties
who have innocently begun development of claimed subject matter prior to
a subsequently filed application claiming the same subject matter to continue
development without penalty. 9° In this way a party who actually may have
been the true inventor is permitted to continue to develop the patented
subject matter.
Prior user rights are unnecessary in the United States because under the
first-to-invent system, the first inventor is the only party eligible for patent
rights anyway. 9' No equitable rule is needed because the first-to-invent
system provides no incentive to race to the patent office.
At first blush, the existence of prior user rights appears to be beneficial to
American users of the Japanese patent system. However, in order to get
under the umbrella provided by the prior user rights provision, the subject
" See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 65-2. Publication of the application
necessarily erases the ability to keep unpatentable, yet still valuable, technology secret from
competitors.
88 35 U.S.C. § 122.
89 See Gary L. Griswold and F. Andrew Ubel, Prior User Rights--A Necessary Part of a
First-to-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 567, 577 (1993).
90 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 79 ("Any person who, by making without
knowledge of the contents of the invention under a patent application such invention by
himself,... actually is engaged in the business of working of such invention or is preparing
such business in Japan ... shall have a non-exclusive license with respect to the patent right
under such patent application within the scope of the invention and the purpose of business
under such working or preparation.").
9' See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
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matter in question must have been in use or prepared in Japan prior to the
subsequent JPO application containing the subject matter in question filed by
another party.92 Therefore, the existence of this provision is of little
comfort to first-inventor American firms seeking Japanese patent protection,
and has no significant impact on reducing the technology transfer surplus.
d. JPO Compulsory Licensing Provisions
Compulsory licensing provisions permit the JPO to require patentees to
license their subject matter to other parties when the patentee has not
actively developed the subject matter or when sharing is in the public
interest.93 Supposedly, these situations rarely occur,' yet the existence of
these provisions provides a strong incentive to engage in voluntary licensing
arrangements.
The only licensing requirements in the United States are found in
environmental regulations, not Title 35, and cover public interest cases, such
as patentable subject matter that improves air quality.95
E. Comparison of Respective Patent Grant Contesting Mechanisms
1. PTO Interference Proceedings
An interference proceeding is necessary to determine which of two
applicants who claim to be the first inventor of the same patentable subject
matter was actually the earlier inventor." The party who was first to file
its application is labeled the 'senior' party, while the later filer is labeled the
'junior' party.97 The junior party bears the burden of proving an earlier
9 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 79.
Id. at art. 83 and art. 93. There are two situations where the JPO can grant a third
party a compulsory license over the patented subject matter. Article 83 permits interested
parties to request a non-exclusive license with respect to patented subject matter that has gone
undeveloped for at least three years, and Article 93 permits the Director-General of the JPO
to grant a non-exclusive compulsory license when it is in the public interest.
9' See Masaaki Kotabe, A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japan Patent Systems, 23 J.
INT'L Bus. STuD. 147, 154 (1992).
9 Id.
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 135. Of course, the aim of this procedure is to identify the first
inventor, in accordance with the 'first-to-invent' mandate of § 102(g).
97 Epstein, supra note 34, at Ch. 6, II, C(l)(g).
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invention date.9 This entails, as previously described, establishing prior
invention conception, and either prior reduction to practice or reasonable
diligence in attempting to reduce the invention to practice. 99
This proceeding may be initiated by the PTO'00 or by a private party
claiming to be the first inventor of subject matter contained in a previously
issued patent.10' A PTO initiated proceeding is appropriate when two
successive applications are filed for a particular invention before the earlier
filer has been issued a patent. ' 2 In comparison to other grant-contesting
mechanisms, the interference is commonly referred to as a post-grant
opposition procedure because it generally takes place after issuance of a
patent.
2. JPO Pre-Grant Opposition Procedure
Japan uses a pre-grant opposition mechanism where contesting subject
matter patentability occurs after application publication, but prior to patent
issuance or application rejection. The JPO relies on this procedure to
produce any relevant prior art that would preclude a patent grant since
competitors would presumably oppose the issuance of a patent on such
grounds.'0 3 Any private parties may submit oppositions, regardless of their
particular connection to the subject matter.' °4 Finally, each opposition
must be answered individually by the applicant prior to any JPO decision on
the application. 05 In theory, this procedure is designed to prevent future
litigation by increasing the strength of the subsequently granted patent,106
but its practical effect is to delay the issuance of patents.
The primary difference between the contesting mechanisms is that each
nation employs the device for different purposes. The U.S. interference
9 Id.
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
"oo 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601-1.690. This is an administrative proceeding conducted by a judge
in the PTO.
'0' 35 U.S.C. § 291. If two patents are erroneously granted for the same subject matter,
then the issue of first to invent is decided in a civil action in federal court.
102 id.
'03 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 57.
104 Id.
105 Id.
'06 Donald G. Daus, Patentable Differences: Japan and the United States, 17 INT'L REv.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 463, 480 (1986).
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procedure is used to determine the ownership of the subject matter, the
inquiry inherent in first-to-invent jurisdictions, while in Japan the pre-grant
opposition procedure is used to determine the patentability of the subject
matter. The major criticism of the U.S. interference procedure is the
uncertainty created in patent rights if the protections accompanying a patent
grant are revocable."° Critics fear that industrial and technological
development is stymied because wary patentees do not have sufficient
incentive to unleash all available resources for the subject matter's develop-
ment when the patent's exclusive rights are tenuous due to the potential for
revocation."M An additional drawback associated with the interference
procedure is costly, extended litigation. 9
On the other hand, critics of the Japanese pre-grant opposition provision
maintain that abuse of the procedure unnecessarily extends the pendency
period for patent grants." ° Delaying a competitor's patent grant permits
the abusing party a greater amount of time to develop the subject matter of
the opposed application for its own ends."' Of course, the Japanese
procedure is also fraught with costly, extended litigation." 2 The actual
difference between the competing opposition procedures is that one produces
uncertainty and the other delay.
The delay experienced in the Japanese system contributes to the technolo-
gy transfer surplus to a much greater extent than does the uncertainty of
protection in the U.S. system for two reasons. First, as previously described,
the pre-opposition procedures are frequently abused as part of a patent
flooding scheme. Creating greater delay in a competitor's patent grant
provides the abuser with a greater opportunity to appropriate the original
'07 See Paul A. Ragusa, Eighteen Months to Publication: Should the United States Join
Europe and Japan by Promptly Publishing Patent Applications?, 26 G.W. J. OF INT'L L. &
ECON. 143, 163 (1992). Ragusa argues that avoiding the possibility of secret prior art justifies
the adoption of a publication of application policy in the United States.
1e ld
'09 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 154.
I10 Id.
112 See Patent Protections in Japan I, supra note 1, at 16. The filing costs for foreign
JPO applicants are the highest in the world due the enormous expense of translations and high
fees charged by Japanese patent attorneys. "[T]he average cost of filing a 25-page patent
application in Japan was $4772, while in the U.S. it was $1390." ld.; Spero, supra note 6,
at 64. Spero, CEO of Fusion Systems, provides the starkest example of lengthy and costly
patent litigation in Japan. Fusion spent the better part of fourteen years embroiled in a patent
dispute with Mitsubishi over microwave technology developed by Fusion. Id.
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subject matter and file its own applications on alterations and improvements
of the subject matter.' Secondly, since employing the pre-opposition
procedures is costly in terms of legal fees, the typical small, less liquid
American firm is less able to use the procedures offensively to stall a
competitor's grant, and more likely to have its resources depleted in
answering oppositions than the typical large Japanese conglomerate.1 4
F. Comparison of Respective Infringement Protections
1. U.S. Infringement Protections
In the United States, infringement protection is provided by both statutory
and judicially created devices. Section 271(a) of the U.S.C. protects against
literal infringement, i.e. producing, using, or selling the exact patented
invention without authority of patentee." 5 This protection is relatively
narrow since the accused infringer's subject matter must be virtually identical
to the plaintiff patentee's for the accused infringer to be liable. 1 6
The limited scope of section 271 induced the courts to develop the
doctrine of equivalents 7 to prevent competitors of the patentee from
usurping the spirit of the original patented subject matter through inconse-
quential alterations or improvements.' To prevail under this doctrine, the
patentee must show that the allegedly infringing subject matter performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve
substantially the same result as the patented subject matter. 9 In practice,
judges are more likely to invoke the doctrine's broad protective power if the
patented subject matter in question represents a pioneering advancement over
the prior art within the discipline, while they are less likely to invoke the
113 See Spero, supra note 6, at 64.
"4 See Effect Hearing, supra note 21, at 46-47.
"s 35 U.S.C. § 271. "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent." Id
16 See Epstein, supra note 34, at Ch. 6, IV, C.
117 Id. Courts generally employ a two-step test for analyzing patent infringement claims.
First, the court will seek evidence of literal infringement, as proscribed under section 271.
If this inquiry is fruitless, then the court may broaden the scope of the patent beyond its literal
dimensions by employing the doctrine of equivalents.
18 Id.
19 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
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doctrine if the patented subject matter in question represents only a minor
step up in an already crowded field."2
2. Japanese Infringement Protections
Two practices of the Japanese courts reduce the ability of a patentee to
protect his technology with an infringement action. First, the Japanese courts
do not recognize the doctrine of equivalents when interpreting the scope of
patents.1 21  Instead, an ultra-literal approach is employed, whereby the
courts interpret the patent breadth to include no more than what was included
by the patentee in the text of the application.22
Next, as a matter of practice, Japanese courts are extremely reluctant to
grant of injunctive relief"1 3 As a result, U.S. firms are essentially denied
any legal avenues to prevent a Japanese infringer's development of its
subject matter-their rights are practically unenforceable.
The different manners in which each system adjudicates infringement
claims derives from the different means each system employs to reach the
end of encouraging scientific advancement. The means selected by the JPO
provide strong incentives for patent flooding, the catalyst for the technology
transfer surplus.
V. THE PRACTICE OF PATENT FLOODING
Patent flooding, the filing abuse prevalent in the Japanese system, is
facilitated and encouraged by the following attributes of the Japanese patent
system: the publication of patent applications, the pre-grant opposition
20 See Epstein, supra note 34, at Ch. 6, IV, C.
121 See JAPAN PATENT LAW, supra note 27, art. 70. "The technical scope of a patented
invention shall be fixed on the basis of the statement in the claim for patent contained in the
specification attached to the application." Id.
122 Joseph F. Dunphy, Japan's Patent System Comes Under Fire, CHEM. WK., June 27,
1988, at 26-27. This article relates the infamous American Cyanamid patent struggle, where
American Cyanamid procured a patent for a process using a definitive temperature range
starting at 20 C. A competitor employed the same process at a temperature of 17.5 C. The
Japanese courts operating under their literal claim interpretation scheme refused to view the
competitor's process as an infringement of American Cyanamid's process.
'3 See Patent Protections in Japan III. Enforcing Patents in Japan, Moves Toward
International Patent Harmonization, 15 EAST AsIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Dec. 15, 1993 at
9, 13. [hereinafter Patent Protections in Japan Ill].
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procedures, the long pendency period, and the narrow claim interpretations
by Japanese courts."2 Patent flooding occurs when the competitors of a
patent applicant flood the patent office with patent applications containing
minor alterations and improvements upon the subject matter comprising the
first applicant's application. 125
The previously described attributes of the Japanese system provide patent
flooding incentives in the following manner. First, the publication of
applications permits competitors the access and opportunity to appropriate
the subject matter of the application. 26 By employing the opposition
procedures, a patent flooder can stall the granting of a patent on the original
material, thus prolonging its ability to use the original subject matter without
penalty. 127  Finally, the limited likelihood of incurring liability as an
infringer in the Japanese courts provides additional incentive to patent
flood.1
Patent flooding appeals to Japanese firms because it results in both
offensive and defensive commercial advantages. As described above, most
original basic patentable subject matter is not very profitable by itself;
instead profitability results from spin-off development of consumer goods,
the profit generators. 29 When Japanese firms patent flood for the purpose
of appropriating a portion of the profitability of the original basic subject
matter, they are patent flooding for offensive commercial purposes.
Similarly, when Japanese firms patent flood for the purpose of preventing
subject matter's owner from realizing the profit potential of its subject
matter, they are patent flooding for defensive commercial purposes.' 30
Of course, either defending against or engaging in patent flooding requires
enormous financial resources. Unfortunately for the typical cash-strapped
American user of the JPO, defending against patent flooding is not as
practicable as it is for the larger Japanese firms with greater financial
124 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 149.
' Id. at 158.
126d at 149.
127 Id. at 155.
'28 Id. at 156-57.
129 See Powers & Leal, supra note 3, at 2.
'30 See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 12. This article describes one
aspect of patent flooding as "holding another inventor's basic patent 'hostage'." Id
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resources.1 31 Monitoring the Patent Gazette entails additional staffing and
translation costs, which add to the conflicting incentives that arise originally
from the priority requirements. If the study of published patent applications
does yield evidence of patent flooding, the offended patentee must employ
the JPO's costly opposition procedures to stem the abuse. 132  The high
costs associated with effective use of the JPO generate the incentive to
develop the subject matter more fully prior to application filing, contrary to
the incentive to file early generated by the first-to-file priority requirement.
Of course, patent flooding may be practiced by U.S. firms in Japan.
However, the monitoring resources required to defend against patent flooding
are also necessary for a campaign of patent flooding. 133
Through patent flooding, Japanese firms are also able to induce licensing
agreements with their American counterparts, the related contributing
phenomon to the technology transfer surplus." 4 Patent flooders have
negotiating power because they control the development rights to a portion
of the marketability of the original subject matter. 35 Thus, these parties
can force the owner of the pioneer subject matter to forgo exclusivity over
the original subject matter in exchange for the patent flooder's relinquish-
ment of exclusivity over the marketable patented improvements. This
practice is encouraged in Japan because it is a direct implementation of the
sharing policy that is designed to stimulate the rate of technologicaldevelopment.) 36
Cross-licensing between Japanese finns is a frequent occurrence, where
both parties generally maintain similar bargaining positions. 137 However,
the difference in size between U.S. firms and their Japanese counterparts
13' See Spero, supra note 6, at 58. The notorious Fusion Technology experience relayed
by Spero shows the pitfalls of patent flooding for small firms using the JPO. Fusion, a small
hi-tech firm, was the leader in the 1970's in ultravioletlamp technology generated by
microwave energy. After patenting this technology in Japan, Fusion was patent flooded by
Mitsubishi, a company 10 times Fusion's size. Id. at 60-62.
132 ld. at 64.
"' See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 13 ("[M]ost U.S. firms would not
engage in patent flooding in Japan because ... they feel the cost of monitoring competitors'
filings and submitting large numbers of applications would be prohibitive due to the need for
translation.").
'34 Id. at 12; see Helfand, supra note 18, at 158.
135 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 149.
'3 Id. at 135.
137 Id. at 162.
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yields an imbalance in bargaining power in favor of the larger Japanese firms
such that they attempt to coerce favorable licensing agreements which
negatively impact the smaller U.S. firm. 38 The royalties paid to U.S.
pioneer firms under such agreements generally represent only a fraction of
the income ultimately generated by the patentable subject matter that is
transferred.1 39  By the same token, coercive licensing provides Japanese
firms with access to pioneer subject matter at cheaper cost than developing
it themselves. "o
Also, once both an American firm and a Japanese firm have access to
marketing the same subject matter, the Japanese company will inevitably win
the greater market share of the Japanese market. 4 Finally, the Japanese
firm will fair well in U.S. markets in large part due to its size-large firms
generally have more highly developed distribution systems, and are able to
cut per unit costs with larger production volumes.
VI. REMEDIAL PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING THE
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS
The primary options for stemming the flow of technology from the U.S.
to Japan entail (1) augmenting individual behavior of U.S. applicants for JPO
patent protections, and (2) encouraging legislative efforts, either bipartisan
or unilateral actions, to change the attributes of the respective patent systems.
The various options will be evaluated in light of the degree to which they
may be successful.
"" See Spero, supra note 6, at 64. Mitsubishi's demands on Fusion Systems in their
patent feud over microwave lamp technology is illustrative of how large Japanese
conglomerates operate in licensing negotiations with smaller U.S. firms. Mitsubishi suggested
that Fusion pay a royalty fee for access to Mitsubishi's patents obtained through their patent
flooding of Fusion's technology in exchange for Mitsubishi's royalty-free access to Fusion's
basic patents. As Spero put it, "Mitsubishi was offering us the opportunity to buy back what
had been taken from us in exchange for our core technology." Id.; see Yates, supra note 1,
at B3. Motorola Corp. has experienced the same types of licensing tactics as Fusion Systems.
Vincent J. Rauner of Motorola said, "[w]e have patent licenses with some Japanese
companies, not because we transferred technology to them, but because they got it and we
had to go and make them pay for it with license agreements." Id.
'" See Yates, supra note 1. Yates cites Erich Bloch, a fellow of the Council on
Competitiveness, who states, "[i]n the 1950s, '60s and '70s we gave too much away by
selling technology and licensing things for peanuts .... We need to drive harder bargains
for our technology and get a quid pro quo." I&
14 O d
141 See Spero, supra note 6, at 64.
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A. Self-Help Remedial Proposals for American Firms
Many commentators, especially those who hold that the technology
transfer surplus is the result of Japanese business' expert manipulation the
JpO,142 argue that U.S. firms must likewise become adept in manipulating
the JPO in order to minimize the loss of technology to Japan. 43 Thus, the
following suggests affirmative actions that American firms can undertake to
reduce the loss of patentable subject matter.
1. Improving Translations of Patent Applications
Primarily, this suggestion entails devoting greater resources and attention
to translating patent applications into Japanese since the JPO requires its
applications to be filed in Japanese.'" The actual text of an application
filed with the JPO determines the breadth of protection subsequently
provided by the corresponding patent. 45 Confusion created by an inaccu-
rately translated application will be resolved against the submitting party,
thus the protection sought will be less than actually received.'" Less
protection leads to more patent flooding of the vulnerable subject matter. 47
Many U.S. firms often arrange to translate applications only a week or two
prior to the deadline after which their subject matter becomes unpatentable
prior art.' This hastiness is a primary source of the inaccuracies that
plague U.S. firms' JPO applications. 49 Thus, merely affording extra time
for the translation of an application into Japanese is the easiest measure for
curing translation ills.
An additional practice that alleviates translation inaccuracies of U.S. firms'
JPO applications is double translating."5 By retranslating JPO applications
originally translated into Japanese back into English, American JPO
applicants can gauge the sufficiency of the Japanese language version of
142 See supra section Im(B).
1,3 See Helfand, supra note 18, at 141; Patent Protections in Japan I1, supra note 8, at
16.
144 d.; see Spero, supra note 6, at 65.
143 See Spero, supra note 6, at 65.
16Id.
147 id.
148 id.
149 Id.; see Patent Protections in Japan 1I, supra note 8, at 19.
1 See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 19.
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their applications.'15 Many American firms resorting to this tactic are
touting it as helpful in increasing the quality of their JPO applications.1 52
Additional practices for improving JPO application accuracy include
supplementing the Japanese text of the JPO application with parenthetical
English terminology and as many diagrams and drawings as possible.
153
These measures will aid the applicant in conveying its patent claims by
creating a more concrete point of reference, thereby by limiting the potential
for confusion in interpreting the patent's breadth.
5
'
2. Partnerships Between U.S. and Japanese Firms for the Purpose of
Filing JPO Applications
By arranging for a Japanese counterpart firm to file its applications under
the guise of the Japanese partner as the inventor, U.S. firms seek to minimize
the pendency period for its applications) 5 This suggestion is premised on
the notion that the JPO is inherently discriminatory against foreign
applicants." American firms engaging in this practice reported shorter
pendency periods. 57
The success of this measure is tempered, however, because typically part
of the bargain with the Japanese partner entails permitting some type of
licensing of the subject matter to be patented.158 Therefore, the partnership
results in the loss of some of the marketability of the original subject matter
to the Japanese partner. 59 As previously mentioned, such licensing is a
phenomenon that contributes to the technology transfer surplus, thus the
desirability of such an arrangement is diminished by the loss of the exclusive
development right to the subject matter in question.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 14. "28 percent [of U.S. firms surveyed] said that... their company had the
claims portion of their application translated back into English back 'always' or 'most' of the
time." I.
153 Iam
154 Id.
155 Id.
" See supra section rI-A, the discrimination theory explaining the existence of the
technology transfer surplus.
157 Id. This GAO survey result, though, tends to validate the JPO discrimination theory
discussed supra section rI-A.
18 Id.
15 ia.
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3. Seeking Direct Representation from Japanese Patent Attorneys for JPO
Applications
Since Japanese patent law permits only Japanese domiciliaries to become
patent representatives to the JPO, U.S.-based patent attorneys are ineligible
to file applications with the JPO."6 ° Instead of hiring Japanese patent
representatives (Benrishi/Bengoshi)"6 ' directly, many firms rely on their
U.S. patent attorneys to select Benrishi to perform the filing tasks of JPO
applications." By dealing directly with Benrishi, U.S. firms at best
reduce only the general transmission difficulties associated with communica-
tion through a middleman, the American patent attorney.
For this practice to be beneficial, U.S. firms must realize that the role of
the Benishi in representing patent claimants to the JPO is significantly less
active than that of an American patent attorney representing patent claimants
to the PTO. 63 The aid provided by the Benrishi typically only amounts
to translation and actual filing of the application, unless the U.S. firm
specifically requests the performance additional tasks." Moreover,
Japan's social structure discourages Benrishi from challenging the judgment
of the well-respected JPO civil servant.165 Therefore, a U.S. firm's direct
employment of a Benrishi does not result in the advocacy of its position in
the zealous manner typical in the United States."
Another alternative, maintaining a patent office in Japan, is too cost-
prohibitive for most U.S. firms that use the Japanese system. 67 Of firms
'60 Id.; see Kotabe, supra note 94, at 153. This practice is reciprocated by the PTO,
which bars Japanese domiciliaries from filing applications with the PTO.
16 See Lindgren and Yudell, supra note 84, at 20. Bengoshi are Japanese attorneys, while
Benrishi are not attorneys per se, but JPO agents. Both are eligible to practice before the
JPO, unlike in the United States, where only attorneys that have passed the Patent Bar
Examination may practice before the PTO.
162 See Patent Protections in Japan 11, supra note 8, at 17.
163 Id. Aside from the language barrier between U.S. firms and their Benrishi
representatives, the fixed fee schedule under which the Benrishi operate may contribute to
their lack of proactive representation.16 4 id
165 Id "[A] civil servant such as a JPO examiner holds an esteemed position in society.
Accordingly, Benrishi will tend to defer to, and not challenge or aggressively press, the
examiner." Id.
66 Id.
167 Id. Nine percent of respondents to the GAO survey maintained a Japanese patent
office. The firms generally had sales of over $1 billion in 1991.
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sufficiently solvent to maintain a Japanese patent office, a significant
majority reported improved experiences with the JPO." However, as
noted earlier, most U.S. firms seeking patent protections are small in size,
and have limited financial resources. Additional expenditures for patent
filing would be better spent in perfecting the translation of applications.
B. POTENTIAL BILATERAL LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
These measures, as the heading suggests, would require an exchange of
legislative amendments to each country's patent code.
1. Bilateral Elimination of Patent Bar Eligibility Restrictions
Adoption of this proposal would permit American attorneys to represent
inventors dealing with the JPO, and Japanese attorneys to represent inventors
dealing with the PTO. If American attorneys were permitted to interact with
the JPO directly on behalf of U.S. inventors, U.S. inventors would reap the
following benefits, all of which should contribute to reducing the technology
transfer surplus.
First, U.S. firms' concerns regarding the quality of representation
traditionally provided by Benrishi would be alleviated. As previously noted,
Benrishi do not actively advise clients in interactions with the JPO, and do
not advocate their clients' interests as zealously as American attorneys. As
a result, U.S. firms feel their interests are not represented effectively by
Benrishi.'" Presumably, U.S. attorneys would provide the interactive
representation to which U.S. firms are accustomed. Such representation
includes active advisement and zealous advocacy, which should increase U.S.
firms' ability to gain broader protections for their patentable subject matter.
In addition, potential communication difficulties arising from the language
barrier would be alleviated with the adoption of this proposal. U.S.-based
attorneys for U.S. firms would be able to communicate directly with English
speaking attorneys licensed to practice with the JPO. Also, American
attorneys practicing in Japan would have a greater opportunity to shepherd
translations of U.S. firms' patent applications, thus reducing inaccurate
translations, a cause of lower than expected JPO protections.
Finally, such a provision would create an additional job market for
168Id.
169 d.
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American attorneys in Japan. While this would not impact the technology
transfer surplus directly, creating a new market for U.S. attorney services
seems to be a beneficial byproduct of this proposal. Of course, Japanese
attorneys would be free to usurp patent representation jobs formerly held by
U.S. attorneys who handled Japanese firms' patent needs in dealing with the
PTO, but it is well known that the United States produces a larger number
of attorneys than Japan.1 70
2. The Effects of Patent Harmonization Treaty Efforts on the Reduction
of Technology Transfer Surplus
"Patent Harmonization" refers to efforts of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO)17 1 to produce an accord among all countries to
amend their respective patent codes so that a uniform body of patent law
would emerge in order to promote "the efficient protection of intellectual
property throughout the world."'172 Additionally, the uniformity of patent
laws would ideally operate to "optimize the pace of technological develop-
ment worldwide."' 7' This ideological aim is analogous to the aims of both
the American and Japanese patent systems. The result of WIPO's work is
embodied in the Patent Harmonization Treaty (PHT).74
The PHT basically calls for signatory nations to amend their current patent
codes to include the following law provisions: (1) a first-to-file priority
system,17 (2) a one year grace period for filing foreign applications, 17 6
170 See Patent Protections in Japan III, supra note 123, at 14. Japan has 15,000 native
attorneys, compared to 700,000 native attorneys for the United States.
171 See The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in M.A. Leaffer, International Treaties
on Intellectual Property, at 566 (1990). WIPO was created for the purpose of pursuing
international patent law harmonization.
172 L affer, supra note 171, at 567 (quoting Articles 3 and 4).
173 See R. Carl Moy, Patent Harmonization Protectionism, and Legislation, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 777, 782 (1992).
17' Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property as Far as Patents are Concerned, WIPO, Doc. PLT/DCI3 (Dec. 21, 1990), reprinted
in Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the
Paris Convention as Far as Patents are Concerned, WIPO, Diplomatic Conference, pt. 1, at
11-53 (1991).
175 Id. art. 9(2).
176 Id. art. 12.
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(3) publication of patent applications eighteen months after filing,'" (4)
application examination within three years of filing,17 8 (5) a patent term of
twenty years running from the filing date of the application, 79 (6) prior
user rights,se (7) post-grant opposition mechanisms,'' (8) a doctrine of
equivalents,'8 2 and (9) remedies including injunctive relief and damag-
es.
18 3
In order for the United States to comply with this list of provisions,
Congress would have to promulgate numerous amendments to Title 35.84
As of January 1994, however, this point was made moot by Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown's announcement that the United States was ceasing its
involvement with the PHT negotiations, and therefore would not seek the
proposed amendments. 5
3. United States-Japan Patent Harmonization Negotiations
However, prior to Secretary Brown's announcement, representatives for
both the JPO and PTO began negotiating patent harmonization measures
between themselves, including the basic PHT proposals."s To date, these
negotiations have resulted in the following agreements.
On January 20, 1994, PTO Commissioner, Bruce Lehman, formalized an
agreement with Japan that required Congress to consider legislation calling
for the establishment of a twenty year patent term to commence from the
I Id. art. 15.
178 Id. art. 16(2).
'7 Id. art. 22(2)(a).
"o Id art. 20(l). Prior user rights are optional under Alternative A of PHT, while
mandatory under Alternative B.
18 Id art. 18(1).
,82 Id. art. 21(2).
183 Id. art. 23(l).
IS4 See generally, Richard C. Wilder, An Overview of Changes to the Patent Law of the
United States After the Patent Law Treaty, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 497 (1993). Wilder
provides an in depth summary of the changes in U.S. patent law that would be necessary to
achieve compliance with the PHT.
185 Patents: U.S. Says 'Not Now' on First-to-File, Agrees with Japan on Patent Term,
Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at d2 (Jan. 27, 1994).
136 Id
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application filing date, identical to the Japanese patent term."7 The
agreement also requires the Japanese to introduce legislation that would
require the JPO to accept English language patent applications when
followed by Japanese translations within two months of the initial filing,
which would harmonize with the corresponding U.S. provision. 8
Then, on August 16, 1994, the same parties concluded another harmoniza-
tion agreement. 89 The United States must consider the adoption of an
application publication measure, as well as measures expanding third party
participation in the interference proceeding.' 90 The concessions exacted
from the JPO include consideration of a post-grant opposition procedure to
replace the current pre-grant opposition procedure, consolidation of multiple
oppositions into a single proceeding, and accelerated examination procedures
that require application examinations to occur within 36 months of
filing. 1"
The remaining differences between the Japanese and U.S. patent systems,
assuming promulgation of the measures agreed upon by the JPO and PTO,
would be the priority determination systems and infringement protection
mechanisms.
4. Analysis of PTO Concessions Resulting from U.S.-Japan Patent
Harmonization Negotiations and Their Effect on the Technology Transfer
Surplus
To summarize the agreements reached between the United States and
Japan on patent harmonization, the PTO agreed to introduce legislation
calling for the following changes in U.S. patent law:
(1) Change the length of the patent term from seventeen
to twenty years from the date of application filing"9
187 Legislation: 20-Year Patent Term Bill is Introduced For Administration, 48 PAT.
TIRADmARK & CoPYiGrr J. (BNA) 121 (1994). The agreement reached between the PTO
and JPO has resulted in repeated legislative efforts to amend Title 35 to conform to the
agreement, including bills in both houses of Congress (H.R. 359 and S.B. 284).
IN id.
189 Treaties: U.S.-Japan Conclude Agreement on Reexamination and Publication, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 412 (1994).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 id.
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(2) Publish patent applications eighteen months after
filing19a
(3) Expand opportunities for third parties to intervene in
application reexaminations.11
The JPO agreed to introduce legislation calling for the following changes
in Japan patent law:
(1) Accept English language applications when followed
by Japanese translations within two months of original
filing 95
(2) Permit only post-grant patent oppositions"'
(3) Consolidation of multiple oppositions into a single
proceeding"9
(4) Application examinations within thirty-six months of
filing.
Changing the length of the U.S. patent term will not significantly impact
the technology transfer surplus. The difference between a patent term
running 17 years from the date of issuance and 20 years from the date of
filing is merely cosmetic. Under the current setup, considering that the
average pendency period is nineteen months, the typical patent term expires
almost nineteen years from the filing date."
Likewise, permitting third parties greater access to interference proceed-
ings will have little substantive effect on the technology transfer surplus. So
long as the opposition procedure continues to be held after patent issuance,
the present protections available with a PTO patent will remain substantially
the same.
However, critics voice major concerns regarding the adoption of a patent
application publication provision and its impact on the technology transfer
surplus. First, publication will likely provide incentives for patent flooding
193 id.
19 L
19s Id.
19 6 Id.
19 id.
198 IdL
t9 See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 20.
[Vol. 25:561
'TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SURPLUS'
the PTO.2°° Next, publication will likely eliminate the ability of owners
of unpatentable subject matter to protect the subject matter as trade
secrets."° Finally, publishing applications will likely instigate a domestic
technology transfer from small U.S. firms to large U.S. firms.' 2  The
argument is that such consequences may reduce the level of protection
provided by PTO patents to an unacceptable degree-a level that would fan
the flames of the technology transfer surplus instead of dousing them. While
formidable, each of these criticisms is rebuttable by equally formidable
counter arguments.
a. Why PTO Application Publication Eighteen Months after Filing Will
Not Provide Incentives for Patent Flooding
The obvious implication is that patent flooding will become a frequent
occurrence in the U.S. patent system if patent applications are published.
However, several attributes of the American system will likely prevent patent
flooding from becoming a commonplace practice.
First, since the average application pendency period is nineteen to twenty
months, the application will generally be published and unprotected only a
couple of months prior to issuance (recall that publication would not occur
until eighteen months after filing) if it contains patentable subject matter. 3
Japan's pendency period, six to seven years, leaves subject matter publicly
divulged and unprotected for at least five years prior to patent issuance.2°4
Japan's pre-opposition grant mechanism contributes significantly to the
average JPO pendency period.' 5 This is not a problem for PTO applicants
because the existing post-grant opposition procedure would still be in force.
In a practical sense, most competitors of the PTO patentee would be unable
to improve upon the patentable subject matter within the short pendency
period.
Moreover, the existence of the doctrine of equivalents in the American
20 See Effects Hearing, supra note 21, at 47.
" See Earl W. Kintner & Jack Lahr, AN INTELLEcTuAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 7 (2d
ed. 1982). The primary requirement for attaining trade secret status is that the subject matter
actually remain a secret. Once the subject matter is divulged, the remedies available under
trade secret law cease.
' See Ragusa, supra note 107, at 172.
20 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
2N See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 8.
See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
1996]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
system of infringement protections provides a great disincentive to the
practice of patent flooding.206 An even greater disincentive is supplied by
the array of remedial measures, particularly injunctive relief, available to
victims of patent infringement.' Thus, unlike the Japanese system, a firm
entertaining the notion of engaging in patent flooding the PTO would face
grave risks of judicial reprisal.
b. Why PTO Application Publication Will Not Reduce the Ability of
Holders of Unpatentable Subject Matter to Maintain the Subject Matter as
Trade Secrets
Though the notion of PTO patent issuance as contractual in nature'
will be altered by publishing applications prior to a grant or denial of patent
protection, publication will not significantly affect trade secret status for
unpatentable subject matter. The contractual theory will no longer be tenable
because the patent applicant will not receive the benefit of his or her bargain
in the event of application rejection. Under the current setup, an applicant
trades public disclosure of the subject matter for a limited monopoly over the
subject matter. On the other hand, if an application is denied, the applicant
receives nothing and trades nothing because his/her application is never
published; the applicant will at least have solace in retaining the subject
matter of the rejected application as a trade secret. However, if all
applications are published, regardless of whether their subject matter warrants
a patent, the applicant will yield the ability to rely on trade secret law for
protection of the published subject matter. This leads to the concern that
application publication could foster a disincentive for developers of marginal
or questionable patentable subject matter to seek patent protection for fear
of losing trade secret protection over the subject matter.0 9  This
disincentive would be intolerable because it would operate against the
primary aim of the patent system, encouraging technological innovation.
However, this argument is countered by the fact that the primary reason
subject matter is deemed unpatentable is because it is not novel or unobvi-
ous: it is already known or easily could be known by the practitioners in its
discipline, therefore the unpatentable subject matter could not possibly have
m See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
2m See supra section III-A.
2w See Ragusa, supra note 107, at 171.
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been a trade secret of the applicant. 2" Furthermore, since most other
patent systems in the world publish applications, any applicant who attempts
to patent outside the United States forgoes the opportunity to protect the
subject matter of the application as a trade secret against only foreign or
domestic competitors that bother to monitor the publications of other
countries' patent applications." Finally, the prevalence of numerous
additional methods of appropriating trade secrets, reverse engineering for
example, make confidential patent applications of little practical value as a
means of preventing trade secret lOSS. 212
c. Why PTO Application Publication Will Not Cause a Domestic
Technology Transfer Surplus from Small Firms to Large Firms
The fear of a domestic technology transfer surplus is based on U.S. firms'
patent flooding experiences at the hands of the Japanese patent system.213
Presumably, large U.S. firms with great resources would be able to take
advantage of application publication of smaller firms by channelling
development resources into disclosed subject matter more quickly than
smaller competitors, thereby usurping the marketability of the original
subject matter from smaller firms.214
However, the same rebuttal offered for the argument that publication will
induce Japanese patent flooding in the United States is likewise appropriate
for the fear that American firms will patent flood. The existence of the
doctrine of equivalents, and the availability of injunctive remedies for
infringement will provide an enormous disincentive to patent flooding. Also,
shorter pendency periods limit the time for which patentable subject matter
will be unprotected, which limits the practical opportunities of competitors
to patent flood.
d. Why PTO Application Publication Will Not Reduce the Technology
Transfer Surplus-and Why It Will
Most supporters of the publication proposal contend that publication will
210 Id. at 175.
21 Id. at 172.
212 Id.
213 id. at 173.
214 Id. at 172.
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stimulate the overall rate of technological development, the primary aim of
215the patent system. Publication serves to disseminate the subject matter
of pioneer technologies at a quicker pace than the current disclosure
mechanism of publication of patent grants.216 The faster the subject matter
is disseminated, the faster the subject matter may be developed, which means
profits can be generated more quickly.
However, publishing applications would result in the application's subject
matter being divulged only a few months prior to the publication of the
average patent, so the rate at which dissemination would be increased is
fairly negligible. At most, application publication would stimulate the
development of unpatentable subject matter since without publication this
subject matter would be not be disseminated at all.
According to supporters of the publication proposal, publishing applica-
tions would also remedy the problem of "submarine patents" or "secret prior
art".217 Secret prior art occurs when subject matter of a pending PTO
application operates as a novelty bar to subsequent applications for similar
subject matter.218 Since the earlier filed application (assuming the earlier
filer is also the first inventor) is examined confidentially, the subsequent
applicant does not have notice of the contents of the earlier filed application,
which becomes prior art on its filing date.219 The subsequent applicant
could have devoted enormous resources to the development of the subject
matter only to lose the patent rights to the prior applicant.2" The only
recourse for the subsequent applicant would be to establish first inventor
status. Presumably, publishing patent applications would provide notice to
other entities in the discipline that the subject matter was already claimed in
a previously filed application.221
However, only when the pendency period for the earlier filed application
exceeds the point at which the earlier filed application would be published,
eighteen months, would publishing cure the secret prior art problem. For
example, secret prior art would affect only the later of two applicants filing
215 Id. at 174.
216 id.
217 Id. at 164.
211 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(e) the
invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in
the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . .
219 See Epstein, supra note 34, at Ch. 6, II, C.
See Ragusa, supra note 107, at 165.
221 Id.
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within eighteen months of one another. Moreover, even if application
publication would provide some relief for the secret prior art problem, it still
would have no significant effect on reducing the technology trade surplus.
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that publication of PTO patent
applications alone will have little significant impact, positive or negative,
on the technology transfer surplus. However, if the PTO publication
proposal is viewed as a bargaining chip to be conceded in return for certain
JPO concessions, the proposal assumes enormous value. This is so because
the JPO concessions would reduce the ability of Japanese firms to engage in
patent flooding, thereby assisting in reducing the technology transfer surplus.
5. Analysis of JPO Concessions Resulting from JPO-PTO Patent
Harmonization Negotiations and Their Effect on the Technology Transfer
Surplus
a. Why Acceptance of English Language Applications for the Purpose
of Establishing Priority Will Reduce the Technology Transfer Surplus
The acceptance of English language applications should operate to reduce
the technology transfer surplus in the following way. Japan's first-to-file
system encourages early application filing.222 The incentive to file early
leads to hastily prepared applications.2" Time limitations, combined with
the JPO native language requirement, increase the frequency of inaccuracies
in U.S. applications.2" As we have seen, curing translation inaccuracies
would be a positive step in reducing the technology transfer surplus.
Permitting English language applications followed by a Japanese translation
within two months, should reduce the frequency of claim inaccuracies.
b. Why the Elimination of Pre-Grant Oppositions Will Reduce the
Technology Transfer Surplus
The abuse of the pre-grant opposition mechanism significantly delays the
issuance of a JPO patent.2" Since the JPO publishes applications eighteen
months after filing and the pendency period is about six to seven years from
m See Conley, supra note 68, at 785.
223 See Patent Protections in Japan II, supra note 8, at 14.
24 id.
2' Id. at 9.
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the filing date, the subject matter of all applications is prone to appropriation
by competitors who have ample opportunity to patent flood.
226
Post-grant opposition procedures should significantly reduce the pendency
period. As a result, the subject matter is unprotected for a shorter duration,
and competitors have less of an opportunity for patent flooding. The original
holder of the subject matter should have an increased opportunity to
exclusively develop the subject matter. If the original American inventor has
a greater opportunity to develop the subject matter, then the technology
transfer surplus will be reduced.
c. Why Automatic Examination within 3 Years of Filing Will Reduce
the Technology Transfer Surplus
Automatic JPO examination should reduce the technology transfer surplus
for substantially the same reasons as the switch to a post-grant opposition
mechanism. Examination within three years should shorten the pendency
period for applications, thereby reducing the period in which the subject
matter is unprotected and a patent flooding target. If the applicant is a U.S.
entity, this translates into a greater opportunity to exclusively develop the
subject matter which will reduce the technology transfer surplus.
. Provided that these proposed measures are promulgated by the respective
legislative bodies, the agreements reached between the PTO and JPO will
have a significant impact on limiting the practice of patent flooding, which
is the primary catalyst of the technology transfer surplus. As discussed
above, an additional bilateral agreement permitting reciprocal patent bar
membership would also contribute to reducing the technology transfer
surplus, and thereby reduce the trade deficit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current American and Japanese patent systems not only permit, but
encourage the technology transfer surplus from the United States to Japan,
which in turn contributes significantly to the trade deficit between the two
countries. U.S. firms have their patentable subject matter appropriated by
Japanese firms through practices implicitly condoned and permitted by the
JPO.
Though the ideological aims of the respective patent systems are
m Id. at 10.
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synonymous, the differences in the respective legal frameworks encourage
patent flooding and coercive licensing which create the technology transfer
surplus. Additionally, the realities of the business world contribute to the
technology transfer surplus. The typical Japanese firm seeking patent
protection is a large conglomerate, while the typical U.S. firm seeking patent
protection is a small, closely held entity. Large Japanese firms easily engage
in patent flooding and coercive licensing practices because the Japanese
system is conducive to this type of manipulation. Unfortunately the small
American firm is typically the prey of such conduct.
Thankfully for U.S. firms, the technology transfer surplus is reversible.
Private remedial efforts on the part of U.S. firms, and legislative efforts on
the part of both patent offices will help to stem the one-way flow of
technology from the United States to Japan. By improving JPO application
translations, American firms can help increase the adequacy of their patent
protections in Japan. If the proposals are adopted, the agreements reached
between the JPO and PTO that address specific harmonization issues will
also increase the adequacy of patent protection in Japan. Finally, negotiating
for U.S. attorneys' admission to the JPO patent bar will operate to increase
the sufficiency of U.S. firms' JPO patent protections.
Fortunately, reducing the technology transfer surplus can be accomplished
without compromising the features of the U.S. patent system that promote
the innovative activities of small American firms, such as the first-to-invent
priority system, the doctrine of equivalents, and the availability of injunctive
relief for infringement claims.
Reducing the technology transfer surplus will diminish the trade deficit
because U.S. firms will realize greater control of the development, and hence
the market potential, of their patentable subject matter.
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